This paper models the strategic pre-tender offer share acquisition problem faced by potential bidders in takeovers. The model provides a rational explanation for the seemingly anomalous empirical evidence that the information about the impending tender offers is not fully conveyed through the potential bidders' pre-tender offer trades and for the evidence that a large fraction of bidders do not hold any target shares prior to launching the tender offers. Additional testable implications are also provided.
I. Introduction
Extensive research effort has been devoted to understanding various aspects of the contest for corporate control; however, little, if any, attention has been paid to examining how bidders strategically decide on the extent of open market purchase of target shares prior to tender offers. This is particularly surprising in light of the fact that important papers by Grossman and Hart (1980) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) (SV hereafter) identify gains on the pre-tender offer shareholdings as a major source of profit for bidders in acquisition ventures. Under the Williams Act, the potential bidder is required to file schedule 13-D with the Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) disclosing his holdings and intentions within 10 days after purchasing 5 percent of target shares. Prior to filing the 13-D statement, however, the bidder has monopolistic access to the information concerning the impending tender offer. The intuition provided by Kyle's (1985) analysis of a monopolistically informed trader suggests that during the preannouncement period, the potential bidder should intensely purchase the target shares in the open market until the prices are driven up to the expected post-announcement price. It has been found empirically, however, that not only does the stock price appreciate significantly on announcement of the tender offer, but also that the initial foothold of the bidders at the time of the tender offers shows striking cross-sectional variation.
*Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024, and College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, Champaign, IL 61820, respectively. The authors thank Michael Brennan, David Hirshleifer, JFQA Editor Jonathan Karpoff, and JFQA Referee Robert Hansen for many helpful comments and suggestions.
